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Abstract
We study a dynamic game in which players can steal parts of a homo-
geneous and perfectly divisible pie from each other. The e¤ectiveness of a
players theft is a random function which is stochastically increasing in the
share of the pie the agent currently owns.We show how the incentives to
preempt or to follow the rivals change with the number of players involved
in the game and investigate the conditions that lead to the occurrence of
symmetric or asymmetric equilibria.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we introduce and study what we call the stealing game. A steal-
ing game is a dynamic game in which a number of agents steal portions of a
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homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie from each other. The portion of the pie
that a player can steal is stochastic. However, the expected value of this random
variable is increasing in the agents current holdings such that larger players are
able on average to steal larger portions. Within such a framework, agents must
decide when and whom to rob, with the goal of nishing the game as the leader,
i.e., the player who holds the largest share of the pie.1
Our primary goal is to solve for the optimal timing strategies of the agents.
We want to nd the best moment for a player to behave aggressively and steal
part of the pie owned by his rivals. Such a decision is a¤ected by an intuitive
trade-o¤ between preempting or postponing ones move. A player who moves
as soon as possible eliminates the possibility of being preempted, but he is then
forced to passively su¤er the potential retaliation of those who waited. On the
other hand, a player who postpones his move can observe the new state of the
world and react optimally. However, the agent faces the risk of being preempted
and robbed by a rival, in which case his market share goes down as does the
expected e¤ectiveness of his stealing attempt.
We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of the stealing game under dif-
ferent specications for the number of players, the duration of the game, and the
number of stealing possibilities players are endowed with. We start by explicitly
solving a two-period stealing game in which players have a single stealing oppor-
tunity. Despite its simplicity, this setting highlights the strategic peculiarities of
the game and shows how the above-mentioned trade-o¤ has di¤erent solutions
depending on the number of participants. No player postpones his move in a
1As an example of a situation that matches some of the key features of the game, consider the
case of electoral competition among political candidates. By campaigning on specic topics, a
candidate may target a particular opponent and thus steala portion of his voters. Moreover,
larger players (i.e., candidates with many supporters) are usually able to raise more funds, so
they can a¤ord more expensive campaigns, which are in turn expected to be more e¤ective.
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two-player game. A three-player game displays multiple equilibria and, in some
of them, all agents postpone their moves. Finally, when the number of players is
larger than three, we show that the number of preempting equilibria is strictly
larger than the number of postponing equilibria and that asymmetric equilibria
may also occur. We then generalize some of these results to a setting in which
n players have K stealing opportunities in a stealing game that lasts for T > K
periods.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 formally introduces the stealing game. Section 4 denes the equilibria
of the game when players have a single stealing opportunity and there are only
two periods. Section 5 generalizes the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
In terms of approach, modelling strategy, and topic of investigation, the stealing
game has ties with various strands of the literature. The game is a timing game,
i.e., a game in which agents must decide when to move (in our specic case, when
to use their stealing attempts). The stealing game actually shares something in
common with di¤erent archetypes of timing games. The two-player game belongs,
in fact, to the class of preemption games. These are games in which it is better to
act before ones rivals; famous examples are the Stackelberg quantity game (Von
Stackelberg 1934) and the centipede game (Rosenthal 1981). On the other hand,
the game with more than two players displays some features that are typical of a
war of attrition (Maynard Smith 1974), a strategic situation in which preempting
the others is disadvantageous.2
2More recent literature on timing games has focused on generalizing former results (Bulow
and Klemperer 1999), in providing a unied framework to study preemption games and wars
of attrition (Park and Smith 2008), or in experimentally testing some of the theoretical results
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The stealing game can also be seen as a dynamic contest where agents compete
over di¤erent periods with the goal of winning a nal prize. Within the rich
literature on dynamic contests (see Konrad 2009 for a review), the framework
recently discussed in a paper by Sela and Erez (2013) shares some similarities
with our stealing game. The authors study a specic form of repeated competition
where, in any given period, a rmwins a contest against its rival with a probability
that is positively a¤ected by the rms relative allocation of a nite resource.
Firms are budget-constrained: they start with a given budget, and this budget is
progressively eroded by the allocation they implement in each period. The game
thus di¤er in a number of dimensions with respect to a stealing game such as the
payo¤ structure (a prize in each period versus a unique nal prize in our game),
the number of players involved (n = 2 versus n  2 in our game), and the way
the agents compete (by allocating resources versus by stealing resources in our
game). Nevertheless, an important feature that characterizes both games is the
idea that players are budget-constrained (in our case, with respect to the number
of stealing possibilities) and thus must choose the timing prole of their actions as
well as the fact that, in any given period, the outcome of the interactions among
agents is stochastic.
The idea that players compete by allocating nite resources across periods
is also reminiscent of the Colonel Blotto game introduced by Borel (1921). In
this game, two contestants must simultaneously deploy their armies over various
battleelds, and in every battleeld, victory goes to the agent who positions the
greater force. The winner of the game is the agent who wins in the majority of
battleelds. Indeed, the basic structure of the stealing game is a specic version
of a Blotto game where players can deploy at most one unit (i.e., one stealing
possibility) over a subset of battleelds/periods. Our game is then enriched by
(Brunnermeier and Morgan 2010).
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other elements, such as the presence of more than two players and the positive
relationship between a players strength and the expected e¤ectiveness of his
move.
Concerning the last point, Rinott, Scarsini, and Yu (2012) introduce and
study a gladiator game. The game is a stochastic version of the Blotto game
where the coaches of two teams of gladiators must decide how to allocate a nite
amount of total strengthwithin their teams. Gladiators are then involved in
a sequence of one-to-one ghts. In any given ght, the probability of winning is
a probabilistic function of the ghtersstrength. At the end of each ght, the
winner recovers his initial strength and remains to ght a new challenger. Thus,
some stochastic elements in the determination of the winner as well as a positive
relationship between a players current strength and his probability of winning
are characteristics similar to our stealing game.
Finally, and partly moving to a di¤erent strand of the literature, Dubovik
and Parakhonyak (2014) study a dynamic model of targeted competition (i.e., a
model in which a player can compete/ght against a specic chosen rival). More
precisely, three drug cartels compete over three markets, where each market is
served by a di¤erent couple of cartels. Each cartel can allocate resources to ght
the rival in any of the markets where he operates, and the amount of damage that
a cartel can inict on a rival is positively related to the cartels local strength,
as measured by its manpower. There are thus some important similarities to the
approach that we adopt in modeling the stealing game. In fact, the stealing game
also provides a model of targeted competition (whenever n  3, each player must
choose not only when to steal but also from whom). Moreover, our model also
features a positive relationship between the current strength of a player and his
expected ability to damage a rival. On the other hand, these two models di¤er in
a number of ways. For instance, in our game, the aforementioned relationship is
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stochastic rather than deterministic, all players are active in a common market,
agents do not accrue payo¤s over time, and the analysis is not restricted to a
situation with three players.
3 The stealing game
The stealing game is a discrete-time stochastic dynamic game in which n  2
risk-neutral players compete for the possession of a perfectly divisible resource
the size of which is constant and normalized to 1. Let ti 2 [0; 1] be the share of
the resource that agent i 2 f1; :::; ng holds at time t 2 f1; :::; T + 1g where T  2
is nite and common knowledge. The vector t = (t1; :::; 
t
n) such that
P
i 
t
i = 1
thus denes the allocation at time t with 1 =
 
1
n
; :::; 1
n

.
The goal of the players is to be the largest shareholder at the moment the
game is over (i.e., at t = T + 1). Throughout the game, the only way in which an
agent can increase his holdings is to steal part of the resource from someone else.
Each agent is endowed with K < T stealing opportunities. A players problem
consists of deciding when to use these opportunities (agents can use at most one
stealing opportunity per period) and which opponent to target (agents can steal
from a single rival).3 The vector kt = (kt1; :::; k
t
n) with k
t
i 2 f0; :::; Kg describes
playersremaining stealing opportunities at the beginning of period t.
The state of the game at time t is thus dened by t = (t; kt). In any period
t 2 f1; :::; Tg, agents rst observe t and then simultaneously choose whether to
3There are a number of things to notice here. First, we set K < T because we are interested
in studying a situation in which stealing opportunities are a scarce resource, and players must
decide when to use them. Second, an agent can freely change the rival he targets across periods:
agent a may steal from b in a certain period and then from c in a subsequent period. Finally,
we assume for simplicity that there are no explicit monetary costs associated with the act of
stealing. Such an assumption implies little loss of generality since all the results would remain
valid as long as stealing costs do not exceed a certain threshold.
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remain inactive (action ati = ;) or steal from a specic opponent j (action ati =
j). Obviously, an agent who runs out of stealing opportunities must necessarily
remain inactive. We indicate with Ati a players action space and with a
t =
(at1; :::; a
t
n) an action prole.
Whenever an agent plays ati = j, the maximal amount s
t
i 2 [0; 1] that agent
i can steal from j is determined by the realization of the random variable Sti .
Let sti denote the expected value of S
t
i . The following assumption states that on
average larger players are better thieves, i.e., players whose stealing attempts are
expected to be more e¤ective.
Assumption 1 sti = f(
t
i) with f(0) = 0 and f
0() > 0.
Clearly, there may be cases of excess demand, i.e., situations in which one
or more players simultaneously steal from agent j but js holdings are not enough
to satisfy aggregate demand. More formally,
P
l:atl=j
stl > 
t
j. Whenever such an
event occurs, we assume that thieves obtain a share that is proportional to the
strength of their stealing attempts. We can thus dene the actual amount yti  sti
that agent i manages to steal from j as follows
yti = min
(
sti;
stiP
l:atl=j
stl
tj
)
(1)
Agentspayo¤s are determined by the nal allocation of the resource. More
precisely, the player who, in period T + 1, holds the largest share gets a prize of
size 1. The others get zero. If there is more than one market leader, the prize is
equally shared among the winners.
We follow the standard practice in the stochastic games literature (see for
instance Maskin and Tirole 2001) and focus on Markov strategies. Let ht =
(a1; :::; at 1) be the history of the game at the beginning of period t, i.e., the
sequence of actions chosen up to period t   1. A Markov strategy depends only
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on the current state t and not on the entire history of play ht. Formally, it
is given by i =
 
1i ; :::; 
T
i

where ti maps the current state into actions, i.e.,
ti :  ! Ati. Notice that we only consider pure strategies as every ti selects a
specic action in Ati and does not involve any randomization. We indicate with
 = (1; :::; n) a prole of pure Markov strategies.
We use as a solution concept the notion of Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE).
AMPE is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which all players use Markov strategies
(see againMaskin and Tirole 2001). Let ui () indicate the agents expected payo¤
given the strategy prole . A prole ^ = (^1; :::; ^n) is a pure strategy MPE if
for any t, ht, and i
ui (^i; ^ i j ht)  ui (i; ^ i j ht) for all i. (2)
3.1 Some preliminary results
The following lemma, whose proof is trivial and is therefore omitted, reduces the
set of strategies that can be part of a MPE. It states that in any equilibrium, all
agents use all their stealing opportunities.
Lemma 1 Let the strategy prole ^ = (^1; :::; ^n) be a Markov perfect equilib-
rium. Then, ^i is such that kT+1i = 0 for any i 2 N .
Lemma 2 denes instead the relationship between an agents current holdings
(ti) and the expected value of his loot (y
t
i). It states that y
t
i is strictly increasing
in ti. The result immediately follows from Assumption 1 and the denition of y
t
i
(see expression 1).
Lemma 2 yti = g(
t
i) with g(0) = 0 and g
0() > 0.
In the remaining of the paper, we will also extensively use the notion of a
circleof players.
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Denition 3 Given any set of agents M  N where jM j = m  2, a circle of
players Ctm forms in M at time t if for any i 2M there is a unique j 2M such
that atj = i.
In other words, a circle of players Ctm is such that at time t all agents who
belong to the subset M steal from each other.
In the following, we investigate the stealing game under various specications
for the parameters. We adopt a bottom-upapproach, that is, we start from the
simplest possible setting and progressively generalize the analysis. Our primary
goal is to solve for the optimal timing decisions of the players. The fact that the
stealing game is a dynamic game that may involve many players competing over
many periods often renders unfeasible a complete characterization of the equilibria
in terms of strategy proles that dene a complete plan of action for every possible
contingency that may arise. Therefore, we will often dene the equilibria of the
game in terms of the action proles that emerge on the equilibrium path rather
than in terms of complete strategy proles. In other words, we do not distinguish
between strategy proles that may di¤er in terms of o¤-path equilibrium behavior
but still lead to the same equilibrium outcome.
4 The game with T = 2 and K = 1
We start the analysis of the game by focusing on a basic, yet highly informative,
case. More precisely, we study a stealing game that lasts two periods (i.e., T = 2)
and in which players have only one stealing opportunity (i.e., K = 1). We rst
analytically solve the game with two and three players, then extend the results
to the case in which n > 3.
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4.1 The two-player game
If n = 2, each player has only one opponent from which he can steal. The
game is essentially a 2x2 game where players must only decide when to use their
single stealing opportunity. The following proposition states that in the unique
equilibrium of the game, both agents steal from each other in t = 1. The proof
is trivial (in expectations stealing in t = 1 is strictly dominant) and is therefore
omitted.
Proposition 4 The stealing game with two players has a unique MPE. In this
equilibrium, both agents belong to the circle C12 .
4.2 The three-player game
When n = 3, the stealing game presents multiple equilibria. These can be char-
acterized as follows:
Proposition 5 The three-player stealing game has four pure strategy MPE:
- two equilibria are such that every agent belongs to a circle C13 (all players move
in t = 1);
- two equilibria are such that every agent belongs to a circle C23 (all players move
in t = 2).
Dening the set of players as N = fa; b; cg, Proposition 2 thus identies the
following equilibrium outcomes:
O1 = ((b; ;); (c; ;); (a; ;)) O3 = ((;; b); (;; c); (;; a))
O2 = ((c; ;); (a; ;); (b; ;)) O4 = ((;; c); (;; a); (;; b))
All the equilibria are Pareto equivalent with ui (^) = 13 for all i since all players
are equally likely to nish the game as the largest shareholder. The interesting
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feature of the three-player game, versus the two-player game, is that equilibria
exist in which all agents postpone their moves. While in the two-player case, any
strategy that prescribes a player to postpone his move is dominated, a similar
relationship does not hold when the number of players equals three. There exist
in fact states of the world where postponing ones move pays o¤. Consider, for
instance, a situation in which player a is the unique agent who moves in the rst
period, and assume he steals from player b. Clearly, this is an ideal scenario for
player c, because he can now observe the new state 2 and then decide how to
use his stealing opportunity (which is still fully e¤ective).
4.3 The game with n > 3 players
We now extend the analysis of the stealing game to a situation in which more than
three players compete over two periods and have a single stealing opportunity.
As before, our primary interest lies in investigating the timing of agentsmoves
and their decision whether to preempt or postpone their stealing opportunity.
The following proposition denes the preempting equilibria, the ones in which all
players move in t = 1.
Proposition 6 The stealing game with more than three players has multiple pure
strategy MPE in which all players move in t = 1. All these equilibria are such
that every agent belongs to a circle of players.
Notice that the number of preempting equilibria rapidly explodes with the
number of players. In fact, for any n > 3, equilibrium proles are not only those
that support the (n   1)! possible circles that involve all the players (i.e., the
circles C1n) but also those in which the set N is partitioned and smaller circles
(possibly of di¤erent sizes) emerge in every part.
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There also exist postponing equilibria in which all the players use their stealing
opportunities in t = 2. However, the conditions that dene them are stricter, as
shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The stealing game with more than three players has multiple pure
strategy MPE in which all players move in t = 2. All these equilibria are such
that every agent belongs to a circle of players, and every circle contains at least
three players.
Proposition 4 indicates that there cannot exist postponing equilibria that
feature circles made of two players because within any circle of this kind, players
would like to deviate in order to preempt their rival. In fact, Proposition 1 showed
that the only circle that qualies as an equilibrium when n = 2 is the one in which
both players move in t = 1.
Comparing Propositions 1 through 4, it is possible to state three additional
results that characterize a stealing game in which n  2 agents compete over two
periods and have a single stealing opportunity:
- whenever n 6= 3, not all the strategy proles where every agent belongs to a
circle of players are equilibria.
- for any n  4, the number of preempting equilibria is strictly larger than the
number of postponing equilibria.4
4Consider, for instance, a stealing game with n = 5. Proposition 3 implies that preempting
equilibria can emerge only in partititions (5) and (3; 2). The number of preempting equilibria is
thus 44: there exist 4! = 24 equilibrium outcomes in partition (5) and 20 equilibrium outcomes in
partition (3; 2) (ten couples can be drawn from a set of 5 elements; for any of these couples there
are two possible circles that can emerge in the part that involves 3 players). On the contrary,
Proposition 4 states that postponing equilibria can emerge only in partitition (5) since players
must necessarily belong to a circle C25 . It follows that there are only 24 postponing equilibria.
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- for any n  4, there exist equilibria that are asymmetric with respect to the
timing decision.5
5 The game with T > 2 and K < T
As a further generalization, we consider a stealing game that lasts for T periods
and where players have K 2 f1; :::; T   1g stealing possibilities. The widening
of playersaction spaces, paired with the stochastic nature of the game, rapidly
enlarges the state space. This fact renders unfeasible a clear categorization of
agentsbest responses. As such, not only a proper characterization of the equi-
libria, but also the mere description of the action proles that emerge along the
various equilibrium paths, appear to be out of reach.
It is, however, possible to state some very general results. These maintain the
same qualitative features as those presented in the previous sections, at least for
what concerns the timing of agentsrst move. The main insights are that in
equilibrium, all players may remain idle for some initial periods (the two-player
case being an exception), and that when a player uses his rst stealing oppor-
tunity, he necessarily belongs to a circle of players. The following proposition
formalizes these results:
Proposition 8 All pure strategy MPE of a stealing game in which n  2 players
compete over T > 2 periods and have K < T stealing opportunities are such that:
- if n = 2, both agents belong to the circles Ct2 for any t = f1; :::; Kg;
- if n  3, each agent belongs to a circle Ctm where t is the period in which the
agent uses his rst stealing opportunity. In particular, t = 1 if m = 2 whereas
t 2 f1; :::; T  K + 1g if m  3.
5Let N = fa; b; c; d; eg. The outcome O1 = ((b; ;); (a; ;); (;; d); (;; e)(;; c)) is an example of
an asymmetric equilibrium: a and b belong to the circle C12 and move in t = 1 while c, d, and
e belong to a circle C23 and move in t = 2.
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6 Conclusions
We analyzed what we called the stealing game, a stochastic game in which players
must decide when to steal portions of a homogeneous good from each other with
the goal of nishing with the largest share. The peculiarity of the game is that the
expected e¤ectiveness of a players theft is increasing in the agents holdings. We
showed that in a stealing game with two agents, players always want to preempt
their rival and thus employ their stealing opportunities as soon as possible. Al-
ternatively, we showed that with three players, the game also displays equilibria
in which all the agents postpone their moves. Finally, we showed that when the
number of players is larger than three, asymmetric equilibria exist, and not all
the players necessarily steal in the same periods.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove that the four outcomes are equilibrum out-
comes by showing that no player has any incentive to deviate. Dene the set of
players as N = fa; b; cg and denote the four candidate equilibrium outcomes as:
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O1 = ((b; ;); (c; ;); (a; ;)) O3 = ((;; b); (;; c); (;; a))
O2 = ((c; ;); (a; ;); (b; ;)) O4 = ((;; c); (;; a); (;; b))
In what follows, we evaluate player as possible deviations from the strategies
that support outcomes O1 and O3. This implies no loss of generality since agents
are initially symmetric and what we show about strategies that support O1 and
O3 also holds for the strategies that support O2 and O4. We indicate with ^ a
strategy prole that leads to outcome Ox with x 2 f1; 3g. The resulting expected
allocation 3 (^) = (3a (^) ; 
3
b (^) ; 
3
c (^)) is given by
3 (^) =

1
3
+ yta   ytc;
1
3
+ ytb   yta;
1
3
+ ytc   ytb

with t 2 f1; 2g (3)
Because of Assumption 1, Lemma 2, and the fact that agents are symmetric and
move simultaneously, it follows that yti = y
t
j for any i; j 2 fa; b; cg. Therefore,
3i (^) = 
3
j (^) for any i; j 2 fa; b; cg and the expected payo¤ of agent a is
ua (^) =
1
3
.
By Lemma 1, all deviations such that player a does not use his stealing oppor-
tunity are dominated. We thus only need to show that no deviations in which
a uses his stealing opportunity are protable. Agent a can deviate from ^a by
stealing from a di¤erent rival (we analyze this possibility in Case 1 below) and/or
by stealing in a di¤erent period (Cases 2a and 2b).
Case 1) Consider any outcome Ox, x 2 f1; 3g, and let player a deviate and steal
from c rather than from b. We denote such a deviation by ~a and the resulting
prole by ~ = (~a; ^ a). The nal expected allocation is given by
3 (~) =

1
3
+ yta   ytc;
1
3
+ ytb;
1
3
+ ytc   yta   ytb

with t 2 f1; 2g (4)
Notice that in ~ all players still move simultaneously and thus, by Assumption
1, sti = s
t
j for any i; j 2 fa; b; cg. By expression (1) and Lemma 2, it then follows
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that yta = y
t
b whereas y
t
a  ytc (strict inequality holds when sti > 16 , in which
case yta = y
t
b =
1
6
as agents a and b share cs initial endowment). Therefore,
3a (~)  13 . Consider rst the case 3a (~) = 13 and observe that 3b (~) > 13 . Given
that 3a (~) = 
3
a (^) and 
3
b (~) + 
3
c (~) = 
3
b (^) + 
3
c (^) =
2
3
, it follows that
player as probability of winning the game (i.e., the probability of 3a () being
larger than both 3b () and 3c ()) is smaller with ~ rather than with ^. It follows
that ua (~) < 13 . The same result holds a fortiori if 
3
a (~) <
1
3
. Therefore, the
deviation to ~a is unprotable.
Case 2a) Consider outcome O1 and let player a evaluate the possibility to post-
pone his stealing attempt to the second period. We denote such a deviation by
a and the resulting prole by  = (a; ^ a). The expected allocation at the
beginning of t = 2 is given by
2 () =

1
3
  y1c ;
1
3
+ y1b ;
1
3
+ y1c   y1b

(5)
with y1b = y
1
c and 
2
a ()  0. In expectations, agent a will thus target player
b as 2b () > 
2
c (). If 
2
a () = 0 then, by Assumption 1, s
2
a = 0. Therefore,
y2a = y
2
a = 0, 
3
a () = 0 and ua () = 0. If instead 
2
a () > 0 then y
2
a > 0 and the
expected nal allocation will be
3 () =

1
3
  y1c + y2a;
1
3
+ y1b   y2a;
1
3
+ y1c   y1b

(6)
with y2a < y
1
i for any i 2 fb; cg such that 3a () < 3c () < 3c (). Therefore,
ua () <
1
3
and the deviation is unprotable.
Case 2b) Consider outcome O2 and let player a deviate and steals from b in t = 1
rather than in t = 2 (the same reasoning applies in case a decides to steal from
c). We denote such a deviation by a and the resulting prole by  = (a; ^ a).
The expected allocation at the beginning of t = 2 is given by
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2 () =

1
3
+ y1a;
1
3
  y1a;
1
3

(7)
In t = 2 player c will thus steal from a. Player b with 2b ()  0 takes this
into account and decides whether to steal from a or c, depending on the actual
realization y1a. If b steals y
2
b  0 from c, then the expected nal allocation is
3 () =

1
3
+ y1a   y2c ;
1
3
  y1a + y2b ;
1
3
+ y2c   y2b

(8)
with y1a = y
2
c because of Assumption 1 and Lemma 2. Therefore, 
3
b () < 
3
a () <
3c () with 
3
a () =
1
3
. By the same reasons discussed in Case 1, it follows that
ua () <
1
3
. If instead, b steals from a, then the expected nal allocation is
3 () =

1
3
+ y1a   y2c   y2b ;
1
3
  y1a + y2b ;
1
3
+ y2c

(9)
and, a fortiori, ua () < 13 . Therefore, the deviation to a is unprotable.
In summary, all possible deviations are strictly unprotable and we can thus
conclude that the four outcomes are indeed equilibrium outcomes. Moreover,
in discussing the possible deviations of generic player a, we have spanned all
possible outcomes of the game. In addition to outcomes Ox, x 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g,
all remaining outcomes belong in fact to at least one of these categories: i) at
least one player does not use his stealing opportunity (these outcomes cannot
be equilibria outcomes because of Lemma 1); ii) all players move in the same
period but do not belong to a circle Ct3 with t 2 f1; 2g (these outcomes cannot
be equilibria outcomes as discussed in Case 1); iii) two players move in period
t 2 f1; 2g while the third agent moves in period t0 6= t (these outcomes cannot be
equilibria outcomes as discussed in Cases 2a and 2b). It follows that the outcomes
Ox, x 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, are the unique equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, the strategy
proles that support these outcomes are the unique pure strategy Markov perfect
equilibria of the game.
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Proof of Proposition 3. The proof generalizes parts of the proof of Proposition
2 (in particular, Cases 1 and 2a). Take any strategy prole ^ that supports an
outcome in which each agent uses his stealing opportunity in t = 1 and belongs
to a circle of players. Notice that ui (^) = 1n for any i 2 N . Say that, according
to ^, generic player a belongs to a circle C1m where he steals from agent b. Now
let a evaluate possible deviations. If a moves in t = 1 but robs agent c 6= b (it
does not matter whether c also belongs to C1m or not) then, in the modied prole
~ = (~a; ^ a), player b is not robbed by anyone. The expected nal allocation
3 (~) is such that 3a (~) = 
3
a (^) =
1
n
+ y1a   y1d (d is the player who robs a
in ^ and in ~). However, 3b (~) =
1
n
+ y1b such that 
3
a (~) < 
3
b (~). It follows
that ua (~) < 1n and the deviation to ~a is unprotable. If instead player a
postpones his move and steals from b (or any other player) in t = 2 (we indicate
such a strategy with a), then 3a () =
1
n
  y1d + y2a such that, by Assumption
1 and Lemma 2, 3a () <
1
n
. Therefore, ua () < 1n and the deviation to a is
unprotable.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof generalizes parts of the proof of Proposition
2 (in particular, Cases 1 and 2b). Consider any strategy prole ^ that supports an
outcome in which each agent uses his stealing opportunity in t = 2 and belongs to
a circle of players C2m with m  3. Agent as possible deviations (a steals from a
di¤erent player in t = 2, or brings his move forward to t = 1) are unprotable (see
the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3). As for the restriction on the minimum size of
any circle of players, consider a circle with two players C22 . The strategic situation
in C22 replicates the one that characterizes the stealing game when n = 2. As such
(see Proposition 1), no circle C22 can be part of any equilibrium as both players
would like to deviate and use their stealing opportunity in t = 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is trivial for the case with n = 2: both
players use all their stealing attempts as soon as possible (and thus belong to
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circles Ct2 for any t = f1; :::; Kg) as this is a dominant strategy. When n  3, a
necessary condition for any strategy prole to qualify as an equilibrium prole is
that each agent belongs to a circle of players at the moment he moves for the rst
time. Indeed, if this was not the case, there would certainly exist at least one
player who could protably deviate (see the proofs of Propositions 2, 3, and 4).
Moreover, agents that belong to circles of two players must necessarily use their
rst stealing opportunity in period t0 = 1 (see Proposition 1). Agents that belong
to circles of more than two players can instead use their rst stealing opportunity
at any t0 2 f1; :::; T  K + 1g where the upper bound is due to the fact that, by
Lemma 1, players plan to use all their stealing attempts throughout the game.
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